Abstract. We present a symmetric-key predicate-only functional encryption system, SP-FE, which supports functionality for regular languages described by deterministic finite automata. In SP-FE, a data owner can encrypt a string of symbols as encrypted symbols for matching. Later, the data owner can generate predicate tokens of the transitions in a deterministic finite automaton (DFA). The server with these tokens can decrypt a sequence of encrypted symbols correctly and transfer from one state to another accordingly. If the final state belongs to the set of accept states, the server takes assigned operations or returns the corresponding encrypted data. We have proven SP-FE preserves both keyword privacy and predicate privacy through security analysis and security games. However, to achieve predicate privacy, we put bounds on the length of a string and the number of states of a DFA. Due to these restrictions, SP-FE can only capture finite languages. Finally, we present the performance analysis of SP-FE and mention possible future work.
Introduction
Functional public-key encryption schemes [1] and many of their instances like attribute-based encryption schemes [2, 3, 4] and predicate encryption schemes [5, 6, 7] were devised to support expressive search predicates on encrypted data. However, in all of these schemes, search predicates involve only a fixed number of keywords from the predefined keyword universe. Processing a string of encrypted symbols representing a keyword is essential for the predicates of certain regular languages for lexical analysis and pattern matching.
However, the predicate tokens in functional encryption schemes reveal the content of the search predicates because encryption does not require a private key in the public-key setting. Adversaries may encrypt the keywords of their choices and check the ciphertexts with the delegated predicate token to learn whether the chosen keywords satisfy the search predicate encoded in the predicate token. Therefore, predicate privacy is inherently impossible to achieve in the public-key setting. Researchers started focusing on the symmetric-key setting for predicate privacy with keyword-based search predicates [8, 9, 10] . Functional encryption for regular languages, a type of symbol-based search predicates, was considered in [11] and [12] , while functional encryption for regular languages with additional keyword and predicate privacy is still an open problem.
Our Contributions. We propose a symmetric-key predicate-only functional encryption scheme, SP-FE, supporting predicates of deterministic finite automata (DFA). We make use of Yoshino et al. scheme [10] by encrypting each symbol in the plaintext as an encrypted symbol and each symbol set of a transition as a predicate token. However, direct transformation cannot achieve both plaintext and predicate privacy because some information may reveal to the adversary: (1) The length of a plaintext, n w , (2) the number of states of a DFA, n Q , (3) the number of accept states, |F |, (4) the number of transitions, |δ|, and (5) the path of the transition. Thus, we systematically add special symbols among ordinary symbols in the plaintext, while inserting dummy states, transitions and shuffling states of a DFA. These designs guarantee the adversaries cannot gain extra advantages in the challenge games. However, to achieve predicate privacy, we put bounds on the length of a string and the number of (accept) states of a DFA, thus SP-FE can only capture finite languages.
Related Works. Functional encryption schemes [1] are non-interactive publickey encryption schemes where anyone possessing a secret key sk f can compute a function f (x) of a value x from the encryption Enc(x) without learning any other information about x. However, the predicate tokens in these functional encryption schemes may reveal the content of the underlying search predicates because encryption does not require a private key in the public-key setting. Thus predicate privacy is inherently impossible to achieve in the public-key setting. Shen et al. [9] was the first to consider predicate privacy in the symmetrickey setting. Blundo et al. [8] used the assumptions related to linear split secret sharing, while Yoshino et al. [10] further enhanced the efficiency by prime-order group instantiation. However, in all of these schemes, search predicates involve only a fixed number of keywords in the keyword univserse. Processing a string of searchable symbols, is essential for the search predicates of regular languages. The functional encryption for regular languages was devised in the public-key setting with message privacy only [11] . The functional encryption for regular languages with extra keyword and predicate privacy is still an open problem.
Background and Preliminary
This section presents the background and preliminary of SP-FE.
Deterministic Finite Automata and Regular Languages
A deterministic finite automaton (DFA) is a finite state machine that accepts or rejects finite strings of symbols. A DFA M is a quintuple (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 , F ) where (1) Q is a finite set of states, (2) Σ is the input alphabet, a finite set of symbols, (3) δ : Q × Σ → Q is the transition function, where (q, q , σ) ∈ δ iff δ(q, σ) = q , (4) q 0 is an initial state, and (5) F is the set of final states, a subset of Q.
Given a DFA M = (Q, Σ, δ, q 0 , F ), if M accepts an string w = w 1 w 2 , · · · , w n ∈ Σ n , there exists a sequence of states, a transition path, r = r 0 , r 1 , ..., r n ∈ Q n , where (1) r 0 = q 0 , (2) δ(r i , w i+1 ) = r i+1 , for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, and (3) r n ∈ F . A regular language is also defined as a language recognized by a DFA.
Definitions and Security Model
A symmetric-key predicate-only functional encryption scheme for DFA-based predicates consists of four algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt. In addition to a security parameter, the setup algorithm takes as input a alphabet Σ and a special alphabet Σ . The algorithms are described as follows.
-Setup(1 λ , Σ, Σ ): It takes a security parameter 1 λ as input and outputs public parameters and a secret key SK. Public parameters include two parameters to decide the maximum length of an input string, N w , the maximum number of states, N Q , and the maximum number of transitions in a DFA,
-Encrypt(SK, w): It takes a secret key SK and a string (of symbols) w, where |w| ≤ N w /2, and outputs a ciphertext CT , a string of encrypted symbols.
-KeyGen(SK, M =(Q, Σ, δ, q 0 , F )): It takes a secret key SK and a DFA M as input, where |Q| ≤ N Q /2 and outputs a T K, a string of encrypted transitions. -Decrypt(T K, CT ): It takes a token T K and a ciphertext CT as input, and outputs either '1' ('Accept') or '0' ('Reject') indicating that the result of the DFA M encoded in T K on the input w encrypted in CT .
Security Model. The selective game-based security is considered in SK-FE.
-Setup: The challenger C runs the setup algorithm and gives public parameters to the adversary A. A outputs a bit d ∈ {0, 1}: if d = 0, A takes up a ciphertext challenge and outputs two plaintext w 0 and w 1 . Otherwise, A takes up a token challenge and outputs two description of DFA M 0 and M 1 . -Phase 1: A adaptively outputs one of the following two queries. In a ciphertext challenge, A issues ith ciphertext query by requesting for the ciphertext CT i of w i . C responds with CT i ← Encrypt(SK, w i ). Also, A issues jth token query by requesting a DFA M j with the restriction that M j accepts or rejects both w 0 and w 1 with the same number of accept states in the transition paths. C responds with T K j ← KeyGen(SK, M j ). In a token challenge, A issues ith ciphertext query by requesting for a string of ciphertext CT i of w i with the restriction that w i is accepted or rejected by both M 0 and M 1 with the same number of accept states in the transition paths. C responds with CT i ← Encrypt(SK, w i ). Also, A issues jth token query by requesting for a DFA M j . C responds with T K j ← KeyGen(SK, M j ). The restrictions is to ensure the challenge is not trivial.
-Challenge: The challenger C flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}. If A has chosen the ciphertext challenge, C gives CT b ← Encrypt(SK, w b ) to A; otherwise (A has chosen the token challenge),
-Phase 2: A continues to query CT i and T K j as in Phase 1.
-Guess: A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} of b. 
Notation
Σ is a set of ordinary symbols used to form a keyword/plaintext w, while Σ is a set of special symbols randomly added into w to form w . The special symbols cannot be specified in w. The union of these two sets forms Σ . Each symbol w i ∈ Σ has a unique index s i . The sizes of these three sets are σ, σ , and σ respectively. n w denotes the length of w, while N w denotes the maximum length of w , where n w ≤ A predicate DFA M is denoted as (Σ, Q, δ, q 0 , F ). Redundant states are chosen from Q to form Q and from F to form F , while duplicated transitions are included in δ to form δ . Q and δ are randomized to form Q and δ . The sizes of Q, Q and Q are n Q , n Q and n Q = N Q respectively, where N Q ≥ 2n Q . The states in Q are marked from 0 to n Q − 1, thus the number of transition in δ is n δ = n 
Complexity Assumption
Given a bilinear 3-factor-based composite-order group generator G, output three groups G i of distinct prime order p i for i = 1, 2, 3 by the experiment:
The advantage of an adversary A in distinguishing T 0 from T 1 with the param-
Definition 3. The above complexity assumption holds for any polynomial-time adversary A if Adv A is negligible [10] . 
The Building Block
The scheme by Yoshino et al. [10] provides a good starting point to construct SP-FE. It is a keyword-based predicate-only predicate encryption scheme.
It takes a security parameter 1 λ as input and outputs public parameters and a secret key SK.
-IPE.Encrypt(SK, x): It takes a secret key SK and a plaintext x ∈ Σ and outputs a ciphertext CT . -IPE.GenToken(SK, y): It takes a secret key SK and a description of predicate y as input and outputs a token T K.
-IPE.Check(T K, CT ): It takes a token T K and a ciphertext CT as input and outputs either '1' ('Accept') or '0' ('Reject') indicating the result of the predicate y encoded in T K on the input x encrypted into CT .
Note that disjunctive predicates are used to protect the input symbols of a transition in SK-FE. The procedure SymbolSetToVector is to generate the vector of a input string and that of a symbol set for a transaction (See Fig. 1 ).
SP-FE Construction
We provide main procedures of SP-FE construction. Following that, we present detailed algorithms with comprehensive explanation.
Main Procedures
We make use of Yoshino et al. scheme [10] by encrypting each symbol in the plaintext as an encrypted symbol and each symbol set for a transition as a predicate token. However, direct transformation cannot achieve both keyword and predicate privacy because the information can be revealed to the adversary: (1) The length of a plaintext, (2) the number of states in a DFA, (3) the number of accept states, (4) the number of transitions, and (5) the transition path. Thus, addSpecialSymbols adds special symbols to the plaintext, while addStatesTransitions inserts dummy states, transitions and shuffs states of a DFA accordingly to make sure the same language is accepted (See Fig. 2 and Fig. 4) .
Procedure: addSpecialSymbols(w) Input: w, where w = (w 1 , . . . , w nw ), w i ∈ Σ, n w ≤ ℓ Output: w ′ , where
Repeat 1. and 2. until n w = N w .
1. Set pos R ← Z nw+1 and k R ← Z Nw−nw 2. Insert the (k + 1)th symbol group at position pos with a pre-defined circular ordering starting from one of the symbols in the group. Set n w = n w +(k+1).
The procedure 'addSpecialSymbol'('aaa') and its seven possible outputs Example. In Fig. 1 , is set as four. There are four groups of special symbols denoted as (1)' ', (2)' ' and ' ', (3)'<', '∧' and '>', and (4) ' ', ' ', ' ' and ' '. We have d ordered sequences of a group of size d. For example, to insert the symbols in the third group, one of the three sequences can be chosen: '< ∧ >', '∧ ><', and '>< ∧'. In addition, one group of symbols can be nested in the other group of symbols like in the third, fourth and sixth column in Fig. 1 . After a group of symbols are consumed by a DFA, their effects will be canceled out. Example. In Fig. 5 , is set as four and Σ = {a, b, c, d}. For each row, every symbols in Σ should appear once and only once. In addition, the input DFA has specified all the symbols in Σ for each row. To fill in a special symbol of a group, there is a transition path from state i back to state i again after consuming the ordered circular sequence starting from this symbol. Take symbol '>' as example, the sequence is '>', '<' and then '∧'. There is a transition path:
⇒ q 0 and there are (q 0 , q 0 , >), (q 0 , q 2 , <), and (q 2 , q 0 , ∧) transitions in δ. The next step is to duplicate the set of accept states so that F = and duplicate the other states so that Q = 2 . Therefore, there are three equivalent sets: S q0 = {q 0 , q 3 }, S q1 = {q 1 , q 4 }, and S q2 = {q 2 , q 5 , q 6 , q 7 }. For the third step, the symbols of one equivalent set in one row can be redistributed. Take q 2 row as example. ' ' is moved from q 0 -column into q 3 -column, while ' ' is moved from q 1 -column, into q 4 -column. Finally, exchange state 0 with state 4 and state 1 with 6 by interchanging q 0 -row with q 4 -row, q 0 -column with q 4 -column, q 1 -row with q 6 -row, and q 1 -column with q 6 -column. Set the start state q 0 from S q0 = {q 3 , q 4 } as q 4 and hide the others. Set the set of final states F as {q 1 , q 2 , q 5 , q 7 }.
Main Algorithms
SP-FE consists of four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (See Fig. 6 ). In SP-FE.Setup, the user executes IPE.Setup to obtain a SK and system parameters. In SP-FE.Encrypt, the user executes addSpecialSymbols on input w to produce w . Then the user calls to symbolSetToVector and IPE.Encrypt for each of the symbols in w to produce a CT . In SP-FE.GenToken, the user executes addStatesTransitions on the search predicate M to produce M . Then the user calls to symbolSetToVector and IPE.GenToken for each of the transitions in δ to produce a token T K. In SP-FE.Decrypt, the server executes IPE.Check on input CT i and T K qc,j to test a transition (q c , j, T K qc,j ) in δ . The server obtains the next state j if IPE.Check(CT i , T K qc,j ) returns '1' and set the current state q c as j. The server continues to check CT i+1 with the transitions in δ starting with q c . If the final state q c is in F after checking CT Nw , the plaintext w satisfies the DFA in M .
SP-FE.Setup(1 λ ):
SP-FE.Encrypt(SK, w = w1, . . . , wn w ): 
Correctness
If a keyword w is accepted (or rejected) by a DFA M , the corresponding w is accepted (rejected)by the DFA M . In addSpecialSymbols, one group of special symbols (with predefined order) can be nested in the other group of symbols. On the other hand, a group of special symbols are filled in a DFA is the same order. After a group of the special symbols between two ordinary symbols are consumed by a DFA, their effects are canceled out, namely, the same state is reached as if no special symbols are inserted.
Analysis
We describe a sequence of hybrid security games to demonstrate that SP-FE achieves both keyword privacy and predicate privacy.
Security Analysis
Proof Sketch. The proof uses a sequence of hybrid games where a challenge token is encrypted with one vector in the first subsystem and with another vector in the second subsystem. Let (w, z) denote a token encrypted by vector w in the first subsystem and by vector z in the second subsystem. Try to prove the challenge token associated with w corresponding to (w, w) is indistinguishable from that associated with z corresponding to (z, z). A sequence of hybrid games demonstrates (w, w) (w, 0) (w, z) (0, z) (z, z) (See Fig. 7 ). As the space is limited, we give these proofs in the full version of our paper [13] . In addition, n w , n Q , F and δ are hidden from the adversary. The distribution of two paths of the transition is computationally indistinguishable because there are at least N w /2 symbols added into the input string of length at most N w /2. Game 1. The token encrypted by vector (w, w).
Game 2. The token encrypted by vector (w, 0).
Game 3. The token encrypted by vector (w, z).
Game 4. The token encrypted by vector (0, z).
Game 5. The token encrypted by vector (z, z). 
Performance Analysis
The performance of SP-FE is as follows: SP-FE.Encrypt requires N w number of SK-PE.Encrypt. SP-FE.GenToken costs N 2 Q number of SK-PE.GenToken. SP-FE.Decrypt takes 1 2 N Q number of SK-PE.Check in average for each transition. For the performance of SK-PE, SK-PE.Encrypt (8σ +2) · T add +(13σ +3) · T sm , while SK-PE.GenToken takes (8σ +2)·T add +(13σ +3)·T sm . SK-PE.Check takes (2σ + 2) · T pairing . T add , T sm and T pairing denote the time for the point addition in G, the scaler multiplication in G and the embedded pairing function. On the other hand, a plaintext w of length n w is encrypted as N w symbols. The size of the ciphertext is N w · (2σ +2) · |G|, while that of the token is N δ · (2σ +2) · |G| plus the description of the DFA, where |G| is the size of the element in G.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a symmetric-key predicate-only functional encryption scheme SP-FE, which supports functionality for regular languages. SP-FE is proven to guarantee keyword privacy and predicate privacy. In addition, SP-FE can be extended to a full-fledged functional encryption scheme by the technique from [6] to further manage messages. For future work, we would like to relax the restrictions in SP-FE to support predicates of more expressive languages.
This section proves the proposed SP-FE satisfies Definition 2 (token indistinguishable) by a sequence of hybrid games from Game 1 to Game 5. Due to space limit, we give these proofs in the full version of our paper [13] .
Also, generate a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and set
-Setup: A is given the public parameters and outputs two challenges
j=1 by symbolSetToVector. B performs the same proce-
A adaptively outputs one of the two queries.
The tokens generated in Phase 1 has the same distribution as that by SP-FE.GenToken because
(2) Ciphertext Query. B receives a plaintext w = (w 1 , . . . , w nw ) from A. B transforms w into w = (w 1 , . . . , w Nw ) by addSpecialSymbols and transforms w into {x j } Nw j=1 by symbolSetToVector. B randomly sets S, α 1 , α 2 ,
, and U 2 = U 1 . The ciphertexts generated in Phase 1 has the same distribution as that by SP-FE.Encrypt because
-Challenge: B receives query of challenge token from A. B is given the challenge query for Assumption 1 as
i=1 , V 1 , and V 2 from Z N and generates corresponding tokens for A as follows. Proof: Simulator B tries to break Assumption 1. by an adversary A trying to distinguish Game 2 from Game 3. Simulator B is given an instance of Assumption 1: the public parameter (N, Setup: A is given public parameters and outputs the descriptions of two chal-
j=1 by symbolSetToVector. B performs the same procedures on M 2 to obtain {(
j=1 and {z j } N δ j=1 to the challenger C and sets {{q
from Z N , where |Σ | = σ .
-Phase 1: A adaptively outputs one of the two queries.
j=1 . The only difference between Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 is that Lemma 2 implicitly sets {r
i=1 . The tokens in Phase 1 has the same distribution as that by SP-FE.GenToken because
(2) Ciphertext Query. B receives a plaintext w=(w 1 , . . . , w nw ) from A. B transforms w into w = (w 1 , . . . , w Nw ) by addSpecialSymbols and transforms
The only difference between Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 is that Lemma 2 implicitly sets {r i=1 , V 1 , V 2 from Z N and generates corresponding tokens for A as follows. given is exactly the same as the one in Game 2.
-Phase 2: B continues to adaptively query as in Phase 1.
-Guess: A outputs a guess b of b and sends it to B.
If the adversary A has the advantage in distinguishing Game 2 from Game 3, then the simulator B has the same advantage in breaking Assumption 1. This completes the proof of the Lemma 2. j=1 . This completes the proof.
